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Abstract
Considerable attention has recently been given to sense making
activities in organizations. This paper draws from an extensive
longitudinal study to assess the way in which a group of administrators
responded to the increasing implausibility of their established frame of
reference. The way in which the group responded appears to have been
instrumental in minimizing conflict among members of the organization.
While conflict has its positive aspects, considerable recent experience
with retrenchment indicates that interest group differences can easily
become disfunctional. The model of emergent policy reframing developed
in this paper offers one approach to containing such disagreements. The
underlying concept is that for organization members to make sense of
decline, administrators must simultaneously manage the relinquishment of
an old frame of reference and the development of a more plausible set of
assumptions
.

The purpose or this paper is to describe and analyze the p L oce.«s of budget
cutting in the Riverside High School district. First, the facts of the case are
described with as little theoretical interpretation as possible. Second, some
initial conclusions, are drawn from the case and interpreted in light of the
theoretical framework of Emergent Policy Reframing (EPR) . The attempt at this
point is merely to develop a theory of budget cutting in Riverside; no attempt
is made in this section to draw larger conclusions for strategic adaptation in
general. Third, the findings from this case are extrapolated to other organiza-
tions. In particular, we argue that EPR works to encourage the release of an old
frame, maximize analysis to build a new frame, and minimize the conflict inherent
in the process of change.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
The research reported here is part of a larger study of the way in which
school superintendents manage major strategic issues facing their districts.
Five to seven issues in each of three districts have been studied for over three
years, with particularly intensive data gathering in the 1980-81 school year.
The three districts chosen for study are administered by successful and activist
superintendents, according to their peers and to faculty members in the State
University 1 .< College of Education.
The six issues studied in Riverside included:
a) Referendum - an attempt to pass a bond for a new gymnasium.
b) All Day for Seniors - an issue involving changing graduation
requirements and discontinuing a policy of allowing seniors
early dismissal.
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c) Asbestos - the discovery and removal of asbestos in one building.
d) Vo-j Ed - the coasideiat Lon of joining other dis." ricts in a regional
vocational education center.
e) Budget Cuts - consideration of budget restrictions in response
to declining tax revenues and increasing costs.
f) Administrative Reorganization - reassignment of roles and titles
among the administrative staff, after an unexpected retirement.
In the other two districts, the issues followed included: the disposal of an
unneeded junior high building, a district-wide attempt to restate educational
philosophy, consideration of replacing a principal, formalization of financial
and demographic projections, the implementation of a computer curriculum, and
expanding a language instruction program. In each case the issues were iden-
tified by asking the superintendent to identify items that (a) were potentially
important to the long run functioning of the district, and (b) were currently
occupying (or were expected to occupy) a significant amount of administrative
time.
We attempted to formally articulate some underlying notions of qualitative
research in this project by structuring the data analysis and model building ir
a fairly rigorous procedure tied to six distinct levels of analysis.
1. Raw Data : Four types of data were collected:
a. Interviews with superintendents, other administrators, Board of
Education member ^ a nd other ?Artici pants . Repeated interviews
with the supcrinrendencG and others involved in c-^ch issue were
tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim into computer files.
During the nine months of intensive study, we attempted to
visit each district two times per month. This material forms
the core of the data base. Over the course of the study we
conducted twenty-seven tape recorded interviews in Riverside,
each approximately two hours in length.
^. Observations at r^eetingr. of Boards of Education and variou s
administrative coronlttees . Eight boara meetings and .-"ourreen
administrative meetings were attended in the three districts. In
general, comments on these meetings were recorded directly after
the meeting, and transcribed for computerized access, as a
supplement to field notes. However, over twenty hours of
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adrainistrative meetings on the budget decisions analyzed in
thip p^per «etn taoe recorded (asLr.g separate mikes) and
transcribed verbatim,
c. Documents such as agendas, minutes of meetings, speeches, newsletters
and news releases . A complete set of the material distributed to
Board members and the public was collected during the course of
the study, as were the minutes and agendas of administrative staff
meetings. This material fills twenty-three 2 inch 3 ring binders.
It has been coded for reference to the major issues followed in each
district.
d. Newspaper articles on the local district and other similar public
organizations . Local newspaper articles on the study district,
neighboring districts, and some other community organizations were
summarized on a computerized log.
An important part of the study was the careful structuring and indexing of
this raw data. Without it, subsequent analysis and reanalysis would be painfully
slow and haphazard; with it we have a better chance of building a systematic
procedure into the study. Computerized storage and retrieval allows a strict
discipline of searching for and considering all indexed items relevant to a
given issue and reduces the likelihood of conveniently ignoring some deviant
facts when testing a model against the raw data base.
2. Profile for each district : Background information on each district
was solicited from the superintendents, local sources and the U.S. Census
to ensure our exposure to the broader context of district decision making.
3- T.jre cy cle hi s Lory for each iscue : The i:-.sue is t>.e primary unit cf
analysis in Lhe study. A case description of the history of each issue
studied was prepared from the verbatim transcripts of interviews, sup-
plemented by other material available in the data bank. We attempted
to make these life cycle histories purely descriptive, and to refrain
from dbotrdCt conceptua '• ization as much as possible.
-4-
4. Theoretical analysis for each issue : Each issue then became the subject
of analysis at a theoretical J.e-/cl ii. an attempt to develop a model or
theory peculiar to each issue. Whereas the life cycle history attempted
to pull together the relevant raw data into a purely descriptive but
coherent portrayal, the theoretical analysis attempted to generalize the
description to a more abstract level, to build a model for each issue
without forcing all issues prematurely into one preconceived conceptual
mold. The budget cutting decision described in this paper represents one
effort at this level of analysis.
5. A model of issue management for each district : At this level of analysis,
the aim is to begin consciously generalizing across issues within a given
district. We are still in the process of preparing a theoretical model of
issue management for each district.
6. A general model of issue management and domain change : Finally, at the
sixth level of analysis, we will attempt to compose the district models
developed at level 5 into a general model. While we have not yet published
any material at this level of analysis, the generation and renewal of policy
"frames", which is addressed in this paper, is beginning to take an important
place in our ideas about issue management.
THE CASE DESCRIPTION
Riverside is a blue-collar, factory town of about 10,000 population in
the distant suburbs of Chicago. The high school district draws approximately
2,400 students from several neighboring elementary districts. Enrollment has
Lt^r-r: steady or growing until very recently. However, during the three years of
the study, enrollment declined from about 2,600 students to the present level of
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2,400 students. The total budget for the district is approximately $8 million
dollars per year, and approximately 7 5/. of this total is accounted cor by uhe
educational budget, with the building and transportation budget accounting for
the remainder.
Athletics is a central value in the district. There are not only varsity
teams for each of the major sports, but one and sometimes two junior varsity
teams. The high school basketball team had been relatively successful in
the state basketball tournament. The high school has its own golf course.
The administrative staff of the district in late 1981 consisted of the
Superintendent, a Deputy Superintendent, a Business Manager, a Director of
Personnel, two principals and two assistant principals. The two principals
also carried out district functions, as Assistant Superintendent for Instruc-
tion and Assistant Superintendent for Vocational Programs. These seven people,
all men, constitute the district's Administrative Council (AC), which has met
every Tuesday morning throughout the year since 1971 to discuss a variety of
major and minor issues.
The Superintendent, Jim Peterson, had been Superintendent at Riverside
for 9 years at the beginning of our study. He came into office after a series
of short, unsuccessful superintendent appointments. His immediate successor,
for example, survived in office only \\h years. Pote*"Sua Is-hlghjy visible in
local activities and keeps in close touch with various sectors of the community.
He is also active in secondary school affairs at the state level. One of
Peterson's strengths is an extensive knowledge of financial management. He
plays a leading role in developing and executing the financial activities of the
district
.
Figure 1 : Overlapping Phases in the Riverside
Budget Cutting Decision Process
J F M
1980 1981 1982
mjjasondIjfmamjjasondjfmamj
Early Signals of Change
Recognition of
Change
Development of a Decision
Process
Identify Possible
Cuts
Coming to
Consensus
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Our description of the budget cutting experience in Riverside spans more
than two years, beginning with early signals of the need for budget catting
in March of 1980, and continuing to July 1982. The facts of the case (which are
summarized in Appendix B and presented in more detail in a longer paper available
from the authors) can be classified into five overlapping phases or processes:
1. Early signals of the need for budget cuts.
2. Gradual recognition of the changed environment.
3. Development of administrative processes for making budget cuts.
4. Identifying possible areas for cutting.
5. Narrowing down the alternatives and gaining closure on the cuts to
be made.
The beginning and end of each of these phases is not very well marked,
and thus it is a matter of judgment where the beginning and ending points
are. Furthermore, the phases overlap in time, in some cases substantially,
as illustrated in Figure 1. The entire process could be broken down into
Figure 1 about here
different phases with different beginning and ending points, or perhaps even
into a different number of phases. In our later analysis we shall attempt to
reclassify the facts of the case and key events inLo some other Lyp* or uodcl,
Earlv Signals of Chanse: March 1980 - March 1981
The economic situation at Riverside looked quite good from shortly after
Peterson's appointment in the early 1970s until early 1980. In March, 1980,
a decision had been made to hire two acdicional btat'f members lor the 19^0-31
school year. Plans had been developed to build a new 4 million dollar field
house funded through a referendum scheduled for late in the month. A budget
surplus vas expected for the current fiscal year. In June the teachers' contra.
was settled with a ten percent salary increase. In short, the district's
economic picture looked quite rosy. In the 12 months between March 1980 and
March 1981, however, a number of key events occurred which caused a reversal of
the district's thinking from an expansive into a more conservative mode.
First, the 4 million dollar bond referendum failed in March 1980 by
a 2 to 1 margin. The Superintendent ascribed the defeat to use of a poor
strategy for promoting the referendum. He had deliberately maintained a low
profile with little or no publicity about the referendum prior to the vote in
the hope that voters would simply be compliant with the district's desire to
build a new athletic facility. However, about a week before the referendum,
a member of the community published a letter in the local newspaper criticiz-
ing the district's low profile approach and urging defeat of the referendum.
The Superintendent listed this event as the primary cause of the defeat when we
spoke with him in early April. He vowed to offer the referendum again in the
fall with a more aggressive promotion campaign.
As of the middle of September, the Superintendent still planned to ask for
another bond referendum early in December 1980 to fund the new field house. He
anticipated announcing his plans on October 3. however, by the end of September
he changed his mind about the referendum and decided to delay it until sometime
in 1981. There were several factors that caused this reversal of judgment.
First, a new and higher tax multiplier for the township was announced around the
end of September, and it was felt that taxpayers might not be as receptive to a
new bond issue. Second, from his informal conversations with local business
people, the Superintendent concluded that conditions were no better and possibly
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worse than the previous March when the referendum was defeated. The sluggish-
ness of the national economy ar*d its failure to tura arounc alr.o influenced the
decision to delay the referendum.
While the financial condition of the district concerned the
Superintendent, however, it was not uppermost in his mind. Our discussion on
these issues during the September 17, 1980 interview resulted in four pages
of textual transcript. No other financial matters were discussed in the other
62 pages of the interview. The first evidence in our records that the
Superintendent had begun to question seriously the financial health of the
district occurs on October 16, 1980, when he indicated his decision to pull back
from the building bond referendum one or possibly two more years.
The decision to defer the bond issue also brought closure to another issue
facing the district. The district had been considering joining a regional voca-
tional education cooperative (VOCED) which would have required the expenditure
of approximately $300,000. The deferral of the bond issues made it impossible
to fund this project in the superintendent's mind:
[VOCED] is one [issue] that until recently anyway, I have not had
a strong opinion on, because I have not really formed an opinion
about the full impact of that decision. And there [are] impacts
at several levels. Financially, if you sort out the issues, you
may make a decision on each one. Right now, financially, without
that bond issue passing, I would say no, fVCCED is] nor going to go.
Meanwhile, dur:ng the last week of December, 1^80, a crucial event occurred
in a neighboring city, Bigtown, which had a major influence on the Riverside
district for the next year and a half. In a surprise decision, the taxing board
of the township to which Bigtown belonged cut Bigtown' s tax base by 17%. The
decision was ir. tes^nps- Lo requests fr^xn industrial ccrpocations for ?.
reduction of their tax assessments. Although the hearings were public, few
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organizations had members attending because no major decision was expected, and
the reductions in assessment passed unopposed.
The reaction from the Bigtown high school district was swift. It was
announced that all athletic programs and other co-curricular programs would be
eliminated; 200 of the district's 600 teachers were given notice of termination
for the following year. A local citizens group in Bigtown attempted to raise the
estimated $750,000 dollars to save the athletic program but succeeded in raising
only 10% of that target.
Then, after a short period of strong public protest, the athletic program
was reinstated by the Bigtown administration. Furthermore, 120 of the 200 fired
teachers were rehired over the next month or two. These actions undermined the
credibility of the Bigtown superintendent and his administrative staff. They I
were also watched with great interest by Jim Peterson and his administrative I
staff in Riverside. Bigtown was repeatedly described to us as a powerful I
example of how _not_ to respond to a financial crisis.
Within the next several months, Riverside began to reconsider its own I
financial picture. It had become a regular part of the administrative proce- I
dure in the district to have a staffing meeting sometime during March of each I
year. During the March 1981 staffing meeting, it was decided to cut 5 I
teachers from the staff. About this l Lme fhe Deputy Superintendent
.ar, fore- I
casting an operating deficit of $600,000 for the next fiscal year. While
short term financing had occasionally covered deficits in the past, some more I
permanent response to the developing situation seemed to be called for. I
The decision to terminate 5 teachers was made in one Administrative I
Council (AC) meeting on March 11, 1981. Nine days later, a local factory in I
Riverside, accounting for 5% of the district's tax base, made a surprise
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announcement that it was closing its operations. This surprise announcement
strengthened conviction that Lhe situation in ?jver:.i;J s vac changing and <=?.£*
the phase of early signals that the economic turndown might not be temporary
and might require more permanent adjustments.
Recognition of a Changed Environment: October 1980 - April 1981
When the building bond referendum failed in March 1980, the Superinten-
dent, as we have said, rationalized the failure as due to a poor choice of
tactics. We have no evidence that the superintendent at that time doubted
this explanation. He later ascribed the referendum failure to weakening
economic conditions.
There were other indications that new sense was being made retrospectively
of events that had occurred early in 1980. In April 1981, the Superintendent
was able to look back to the events of 1980 and recognize in some detail the
signals of a downturn. To quote him at some length,
It was exactly a year ago right now, we added two staff members.
It was because of the new graduation requirements again, and we
wanted to make sure we had enough staff members. We'd just gone
through a lot of meetings [on the graduation issue] ...and so we
were in that mood, I guess....
Then by mid-year, it became obvious that—well, the accounting was
already bad at the start of the year. [September 1980] Unemployment
was already high, so seme signals [were] already coming. The election
was i'n November, which really set the tono "for a lo': 'jf institutional
cirection-setting in cerms of: 'wax., a cin-;te. we' rf all going to
have to watch out, 1 kind of attitude, to maintain, to keep growing...
My analysis then... is that I think we've got anywhere from two to
four years, an attitude of readjustment, conservative, consolidation
type thing. And until we go through that, you almost have to be
a part of it. You can't ignore it, you can't say... I don't believe
in that hind of attitude, we're going to do it on our own. And I
don't th.-'nk in the tc-.al setting of thi-i^s, you can act independently,
and go on like the rest of the world does net exist.
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It is interesting to note, that in the interviews conducted during the
"ail of 1980, the Superintendent was still in a reasonably positive mood and
had not concluded that the economy was in a permanent downturn. This shift
in thought developed only during the Spring of 1981, as is evidenced by his
decision in late 1980 to delay, but not eliminate
,
the building bond referen-
dum. By the Spring of 1981, the building bond referendum had been shelved
indefinitely.
Up until this point the administration had drawn only upon their own
interpretation of events. But in March and April of 1981 members of the
board, the teaching staff, and the local community were beginning to raise
questions about the significance of economic events for the future of the
school district. Members of the Board of Education were being quizzed by
citizens about the meaning of the situation in neighboring Bigtown, members
of the teaching staff were asking about the possibility of cuts in the local
district.
Once the closing of the local factory was announced in March of 1981, even
the Assistant Superintendent for Vocational Education, who had been pushing hard
for VOCED, recognized that a positive decision to join the regional cooperative
could not be reached in the current economic mood. It is interesting to note
chat, the Si perintendenc had picked uj information at the lcua Linns Club
meeting in which even local businessmen, who relied on students from the
regional vocational center, had doubts whether it made sense to join the
cooperative.
At an i.C (Administrative Council) meeting early in April 1981 the Super-
intendent commented that "Timing has gone to hell in terms of financing,"
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thus indicating some measure of the worsening situation on the revenue side,
rurtherrorc , discussion took place in the AC meeting about whtre cats could
be taken in the summer budget. A variety of alternatives were considered
including going to four day weeks, cutting out some guidance counselors,
and so forth. One of the building principals commented that "Everybody
is expecting some cuts." This was further evidence of a shift in thinking
toward budgetary contraction and evidence that more people were being drawn
into the debate. However, it was not until June 1981 that the Superintendent
began to think more systematically about the need for further cuts and about
the kind of decision process that might identify those cuts. It is to that pro-
cess of development that we turn next.
Development of a Decision Process: June 1981 to May 1982
The decision in March 1981 to cut 5 teachers from the staff was made
using the well established procedure of an annual staffing meeting. Further-
more, cuts in the summer budget were discussed in the regular Administrative
Council meeting early in April. By late April however, Peterson felt that "our
biggest problem is now the budget." During the summer of 1981 he began to
think more systematically about developing a procedure especially designed to
identify further cuts in "he short run budget and to do longer run contingency
planning for still deeper cues.
In June Peterson identified the Administrative Council as the primary
mechanism for accomplishing these decisions. At that stage he had no dollar
figure in mind. However, he did want to keep the decision process within the
Administrative Council at this stage. He decided not to involve the member? uf
the Board of Education, but instead inform them of the process of deliberation
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and wait to present a recommendation once a decision had been reached. (This
derision ir quits consistent with the way in which other issues had been
handled in the district.)
The Superintendent wanted it to be known among the teaching staff and the
Board that budget cutting discussions were underway for the purpose of develop-
ing what he called a "mind-set" within the school district, a mind-set directed
toward expecting cuts in the budget. His strategy relied on what he called
"controlled leaks"; for example in informal conversation with the head of the
teachers' union, he indicated that budget discussions were going on and that
as many as five to ten more teachers could be cut.
We do not draw a conclusion to this process of design until May 1982, since
an important part of the process involved presenting the Board with formal recom-
mendations for staff and other cuts at the March Board meeting and handling
Board, teacher and community response.
Identifying Possible Cuts: August 1981 - March 1982
While the overall process was still being designed, the administrative coun-
cil was in the process of identifying possible cuts. At the August 1981 AC
meeting, the Superintendent asked each of the other 6 members of the council to
develop a list of areas where cuts could possibly be made, without regard to the
feasibility of the cuts or the amount of money that might be saved. He a?ke-
them not to communicate to each other in developing their lists of possible
areas to cut. What resulted was a list of 181 separate items (included in the
longer version of this paper). During two marathon meetings on November 23 and
December 15, 1981 these possibilities for budget cutting
-ere thoroughly
discussed, and the 181 items were boiled down to 36 categories.
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Explicit criteria for choosing among proposed cuts were developed by the
superini sr ien.. iGi. Lhc November >:3, iS;8i AC mejtiug, with student impact aid
financial impact heading the list of criteria. Also mentioned were Board of
Education priorities, impact on the public, implementation considerations,
implications for contract negotiations, and administrative concerns. This is
the first time during the decision process that decision criteria were explicitly
discussed. During this meeting it also became clear that more information was
needed about the impact of certain cuts, and individual staff members were
assigned to develop that information in each case.
At the end of the December meeting, the Superintendent asked each member of
the council to develop two lists: a list of possible cuts totalling $50,000,
without regard to the number of cuts involved, and a list of the five most logi-
cal cuts, without regard for the amount saved. In response to the
Superintendent's assignment, each of the seven members of the council, including
Peterson himself, submitted revised lists for possible cuts. These revised lists
contained 19 distinctive suggestions for possible cuts, and these 19 items were
distilled further into 15 items at a January AC meeting. Cnce the fifteen item
list had been developed, subsequent AC meetings were held in February and March
1982 as part of the regular staff planning process. In the next section, we will
exaaiint ii s«.»a<efch«it sore detail how thi 3 iecision process wa^ u-ed to design and
shape the ultimate budget cuts.
Coming to Consensus: November 1981 to May 1982
Over the course of the decision, closure developed on both the total amount
of cuts to be made and on which specific ruts were to be made, as well as or t!-e
means to finance the remaining deficit. In June of 1981 the Superintendent
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clained to have no dollar figure in mind for the total cuts that would need to
be mac. This was reaff.rmec at his aeetxng with the Administrative Council in
August, despite their request for a general indication of the size cuts antici-
pated. In October 1981 the Superintendent was forecasting a $400,000 deficit
for the fiscal year. Thus the district was faced with the possibility of
cutting as much as $400,000 to cover this deficit, or cutting only part of that
amount and financing the remainder with various types of short and long-term
borrowing. It was about this time that the Superintendent began to form the
opinion that cuts in the range of $100,000 to $200,000 would be desirable, with
the balance of the deficit to be financed. If there were no overlap among the
seven lists identifying $50,000 worth of cuts, highly unlikely given the long
history of joint decision making, the decision process would have provided a
maximum of $350,000 reduction in the deficit.
A concensus on where to make cuts also developed quite slowly. For example,
the revised lists of suggested cuts developed for the January 1982 meeting still
show surprising diversity. Three indices of similarity of preference among
staff members have been computed from the data:
a. the number of suggested cuts shared in common with
at least one other staff member (for example, two of the
Deputy Si'perirreident's five proposals «re shared, each
with two other staff members, for a score of 2 * 5 = 0.40).
b. same as (a), except that each sharing of a cut with each
other staff member is counted as one. (For example, the
Deputy Superintendent's score would hp (? + 2) f 5 = 0.81).
c the average number of items shared with each other staff
member. That is, the number of shared items for each staff
-17-
member divided by six, the number of other staff. (For the
Deputy Superintendent, this index is 4 * 6 = 0.67).
The results of this analysis are shown below in Figure 2:
Figure 2: Three Indices of Similarity of Suggested Cuts from
Revised Lists (January 1982 AC Meeting)
No. of Suggested Similarity Indices
Staff Member Cuts
_§_ _b_ _c_
3 .67 2.00 1.00
6 .67 1.17 1.17
5 .40 0.80 .67
5 1.00 2.20 1.83
5 .60 1.20 1.00
6 .83 1.50 1.50
3 1.00 2.67 1.33
Averages 0.74 1.65 1.21
JG (Asst. Prin.)
MG (Asst. Prin.)
EH (Dep. Supt.)
JP (Supt.)
SN (Prin.)
JS (Prin.)
RS (Bus. Mgr.)
Thus, on the average 74;£ of the suggested cuts were shared with at least
one other staff member. But indices (b) and (c) indicate that each cut pro-
posed by a given staff member was shared by less than two other persons out
of a possible six. Not surprisingly, the Superintendent emerges as the most
central figure; his five proposals are shared with 1.83 other staff members,
on the average. These indices of similarity are moderately low for such a
late stage in the decision process (January 1982). After all the group had
>>~eii discussing budget cut* ^ince March of 1^3] -
We can also calculate an index of influence for each staff member by com-
paring the original lists with the revised lists. Suppose that a proposed
cut C is on person l's original list. Suppose that persons 2, 3, and 4 did
not have C on the.1' r original lists, but added it to thair reviseH lists.
o ° '
Then person 1 would be credited with positively influencing the opinions of 3
others. If this calculation is made for each of the proposals on list 1 and
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list 2
.
an influence index can be calculated for each staff nenber. See
Figure 3.
Figure 3: Influence Indices for Each Staff Member, Derived byComparing Original and Revised Lists of Proposed Cuts
Ho. of Instances of Change of Others- Preference
Staff Member
• JG (Asst. Prin.)
MG (Asst. Prin.)
EH (Dep. Supt.)
2
3
jp (supt.r^" i
JN (Prin.) °
JS (Prin.) I
RS (Bus. Mgr.) I
Again, not surprisingly, the Superintendent headed the list on this i
of influence with 8 instances where others added one of the Superintendent'
original proposed cuts to their revised lists. The Business Pager's high
index may be due in part to the large number of proposals on his original
ndex
list.
It is also interesting to note which specific proposals lost the cost
support from the original to the revised lists, presumably as a result of the
November 23 and December 15 AC meetings. Cuts in athletics dropped from 6
proposals to 2, and cuts in Board and Administration travel dropped from 4
proposals to 1. From our observation of the district these areas are alleged
to be in ,„e co.e of protected district activities. Driver's Education and
Training was a favored cut in five original proposals, but in only one
revised proposal. Driver's Ed is clearly not in the preferred core, judging
from the discussion we have had; but analysis indicated that savings would be
minimal du, ,o the ,„, ,r 3 ,a,e subsidies were u to be cut. Support for
cutting the departmental equipment and supply budget dropped from four original
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proposals Co only one revised proposal, primarily due to the superintendent's
f.jcus on cuts, in the educational budget rather than in ths building c: t/arispnr-
tation budget.
The most supported items on the revised lists were (a) to eliminate one
Corrective Reading position (six out of seven proposals), (b) to reduce
department chairperson release time (three proposals), and (c) to assign
deans and guidance counselors to supervision of BIC, the Behavioral Improve-
ment Center (three proposals). Six other proposals received support from two
persons, and nine cuts were proposed by only one person. As we have said,
this represents a modest, but not overly impressive degree of consensus
within the AC. Nevertheless, it laid the groundwork for final decisions at
the March 1932 staffing meeting.
The final decisions of where to cut were reached during the AC meetings
in February and March 1982. One new teacher was hired in the Business
Education Department, and six other teachers either left voluntarily or were
terminated. Positions were eliminated in art, remedial reading, foreign
language and driver's education. The key factor in eliminating these six
positions was detailed analysis of staffing needs relative to student demand.
In particular, the Superintendent imposed a minimum class size of 20 students
as "i -.riretion for cancelling sections cf various courses. Tt 2 assumption
was maintained that teachers would continue to teach five sections of class
per day.
Other economies were also realized. Four secretarial positions were
reduced from 12 to 10 month contracts. The Math Advisory Program was can-
celled. Summer counselor help for students was reduced by eight total weeks.
The VIP program for providing vocational information about offerings at the
-20-
local junior college „«. cancelled. The number of students being sent to
VOCED on a per student fee Oasis vas reduced from ten students Per year to
one. Some co-curticular positions (e.g., faculty sponsors for student clubs)
were eliminated. And Deans and Guidance Counselors were reassigned to super-
vision of the Internal Suspension program to compensate for the elimination
of five faculty positions.
INITIAL ANALYSIS
The process we have just descibed has several noteworthy aspects:
1. There was wide sharing of information among the members ofthe Administrative Council, but members of the teaching
staff Board, and local community were for the most partexcluded from the process. The process was an exercise instudied underreaction, in contrast to the overreaction inoigtown
.
2. Once the Superintendent decided that further cuts would be
needed, he set about to design an elaborate process that
would involve the members of the staff in generating initiallists for possible areas to cut. He did not, with some
exceptions, impose his own priorities and perceptions onthe group.
3. Preferences and priorities about where to cut were delayed
until fairly late in the process until after commonly
shared categories and ways to characterize the operation
of the school district itself were developed through an
elaborate process of social concensus.
4. Once the Superintendent decided in June 1981 that Further
cuts weald be needed, the budget cut tine process tool an"
additional nine months. The process was spread out over
a relatively long period of time. A great deal of spade
wor« was done in developing possible future cuts, even
though only relatively minor cuts were made in the Spring
of 1982. However, the district at that time was in an
excellent position to make still further cuts should theybe required because of the intensive inquiry that they
m^de cllecr.ivel), into the functioning of the district.
5. With minor exceptions, the decision process unfolded aim
exactly as the Superintendent intended and hoped that it
ost
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would. Although he made use of a familiar and well estab-
lished decision structure, the Administrati-e Council, the
process i.self was novel. As t ; -e Business Manager concentred
during an interview in November 1981 "this is a totally dif-
ferent kind of discussion from the normal budget process.
What I think [the Superintendent] is looking to is to general
operations of the whole program."
6. While most of the 181 original items did not make it to the
19 distinctive items on the revised lists, the discussion of
the full list of 181 items seemed to play an important role
of sharing information among the AC members. This discussion
helped develop a common view of the situation facing the district,
Furthermore, it permitted the Superintendent to form a judgment
about how deep the cuts should go and how much of the deficit
should be financed instead. Without discussing the lower
priority cuts, this judgment could not be made as effectively.
7. With the exception of the foreign language position, none
of these cuts touched the basic instructional activities of
the district. None of them resulted in mobilization of
resistance by those affected. And all of the cuts could
be justified by reference to detailed student demand analyses.
Host, but not all, of the final cuts were listed among
revised lists submitted by staff members in January 1982.
However, elimination of the art and foreign language
positions were not on the revised lists. Foreign language
was not even mentioned on the original list of 181 suggested
cuts! It surfaced first, and art resurfaced, only during
the student demand analysis in February and March. This
is a nice illustration of the possibility that decision
alternatives can be generated fairly late in the decision
process.
8. It is also interesting to note that some of the cutting
alternatives that had the most support in the revised
lists submitted in January 1982 did not make it to the
final cuts. These included reduction of departmental
c
;Ta: rp-_rso::' c release ti.^e
,
reduc'.i n of tne number of
supervision periods, and reduction of expenditures for
athletics. The general conclusion we wish to draw,
is that closure toward a decision is not a smooth
process whereby an initial set of alternatives is
gradually winnowed down to a final choice. Alterna-
tives enter and leave the stream of attention and
are reshaped, sometimes in dramatic ways. Some alterna-
tive? that appear in early stages to have little support
a-e chosen in the eud, and other that seem to have wide
ecrly support are excluded.
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THEORETICAL ANALYST S.
• E'lERGEOT POLICY 8EFRAHINC
We r.ov turn our rtr£n ,.i OT to developing «, Theoretical framework or =od«l
within which the events in Riverside can be analyzed. The crucial feature
of the situation that needs to be built into the model is that the "policy
frame" within which the Riverside administration had been acting prior to the
budget cuts gradually shifted over the two years of the case stud;,. How the
need for that shift was recognized and how it was brought about is the essence
of the process that we call EPR, or "emergent policy refracing. »
A "policy frame" is a set of values, preferences and assumptions that guide
decision making about most important aspects of the district. A policy tvmm
covers very disparate decision areas, such as staffing, maintenance, financing,
construction, and curriculum offerings. Values and preferences may be about the
relative priorities assigned to athletics, vocational or special education, risk
taking, staff travel, and so on. Assumptions may be held about the growth or
decline In enrollment, the present and future state of the economy, interest
rates on bonded indebtedness, the likelihood of passage of referenda, the course
of contractual negotiations, etc. The elements of a policy frame may not be
articulated, and if articulated, they may be expressed in vague and ambiguous
terras. For the purpose of this discussion, any given policy frarae is denoted as
F., where F
Q
is ,he current policy frame and fj, Fj. F. , etc. denote alternative
policy frames.
Each policy frame at a given point in time is more or less plausible,
given certain events such as the failure of a referendum, the loss of tax
base, the forecast of operating deficits, and so forth. The plausibility of
30
• icy frame P., at time t, given the set of events {e.}, is denoted as
P
t
(F.| (e.}). Following Rescher (1976) and Mason and Ilitroff (1981: 228-240),
-23-
we shall treat plausibility as a probability-like measure, ranging from zero to
one, of the .alidicy of the preferences and assumptions i haf constitute a policy
frame. For a completely implausible frame, p(F.) = 0; for a maximally plausible
frame, p(F.) = 1.0.
l
The worth of any given decision or contemplated action is evaluated rela-
tive to the implicit, and sometimes explicit, preferences and assumptions of
a given policy frame. What seems to be a reasonable action in one frame may
be unreasonable in another frame. It is also possible that an action is
equally reasonable within several frames. Suppose the "reasonableness" of an
action a,
,
given a policy frame F. is denoted as R(a,J F.), where R ranges over
some scale from zero to 100. In the early stages of decision making it may be
possible only to classify reasonableness roughly, say, into high, medium, or low
categories.
Suppose now that over time events {e, } occur that cause the current
K
policy frame, F
,
to appear progressively less plausible. Another policy
frame, ? , begins to seem more plausible. But it is not at all certain
whether the changes are temporary or permanent, how big the changes are
likely to be, or even what the elements of the new frame, F, , are likely to
be. In many cases there are no time deadlines which require that major
actions be taken, Lhat the— Current frame be discredited, o ' h?t an apparently
more plausible frame be publicly described and embraced. Events continue to
unfold that bear on what is happening in the district's environment. What is
the sensible procedure to follow under such conditions? In particular, what
procedures will bring about a shift in policy frames while still minimizing
conflict among tiie various decision makers and among those affected by the
decisions?
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We argue that the logical procedure to adopt under such conditions of ambi-
guity and potential conflict is as follows.:
1. Make small changes that seem reasonable within both policy frames;
avoid decisions and actions that are unreasonable within either frame.
2. Assess the plausibility of both frames by...
a. monitoring external events more intensively
b. monitoring the effects of the small incremental actions that
are taken.
3. Begin to develop an information base that will permit major changes
to be made if and when it becomes clear that major changes are
required.
4. Send ambiguous signals to the organization that are consistent with
both frames in order to maximize flexibility to go either way. Do
not immediately discredit the current frame.
5. Attempt privately to re-articulate the current policy frame so that
it's plausibility can be assessed more fully; at the same time begin
to develop the elements of an alternative plausible policy frame
within an inner circle of trusted policy makers.
6. Avoid making irreversible decisions and commitments until deadlines
foice you to dc so: dc-lay action at Jong na possible so that a
maximum of information is available.
7. Begin to create the awareness more broadly among various stakeholders
that some change may be necessary.
8. If and when it becomes clear that mere permanent changes will be
Laquireu, develop support for partial solutions that will gradually
cumulate into a new strategy.
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9. Develop the necessary slack resources that will permit a partial,
r?.thec than a tocal, response to the immediate Cbut perhaps
temporary) changes in the environment.
10. Throughout the process of adaptive response, identify and protect
the core activities of the district, and also protect the credibility
of the administrative structure.
Such activities constitute an adaptive process that we shall call
Emergent Policy Refraining, or EPR. The process is "emergent" because it
unfolds over time in response to new information. There is not a sharp break
with the past. The old frame is not cleanly replaced at a particular point
in time with some new, fully developed, policy frame. Nor is the old frame
rejected without some new frame to put in place. Broadened awareness and par-
tial solutions gradually coalesce into a new frame of assumptions, values, and
beliefs. The district is never without some guiding policy frame. Indeed the
new frame develops slowly and gradually replaces the old frame; there is a
period of time when two (or perhaps even more) frames are plausible in light of
on-going events, as shown in Figure 4. Within EPR decisions are made and
Figure 4 about here
actions taken not only for the purpose of making adaptive short run responses,
but also for the purpose of shaping and testing new policy frames. Thus,
specific decisions serve a double purpose:
(a) to adapt the operating system to environmental changes, and
( b) to allow post hoc analysis upon which can be uuixt a iieu sat ol
preferences and assumptions about the future of the district.
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Figure 4: Shifting from Old to New Policy Franes
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EPR is broadly consistent with what Quinn (1980) has termed "logical
incrementalis:?" in his SLU'Iy of oorpor.up strategic change. EFR shares with
Quinn' s model an eraphasis on the incremental character of change and on its
logical or rational intent at each stage of the process. More explicitly
than logical incrementalism, EFR stresses the need for ambidextrous action,
that is action that in the midst of change is reasonable within both the old
and the newly emergent policy frames.
EPR is a model of adaptive response within which the budget cutting process
in Riverside can be described. However, before undertaking that task, we need
to develop one further aspect of the model. Quinn (1980) argues that two
analytically distinguishable processes go on during strategic change. First,
there is a formal-analytical process in which the detailed design and evaluation
of decision alternatives is carried out. Second, there is a sec of power-
behavioral processes in which a supporting coalition of organization stake-
holders is mobilized behind the new strategy and their commitment to the new
strategy is developed.
We observe the possibility that these two processes can proceed at different
rates. At one extreme (labeled "A" in Figure 5), the analysis develops faster
Figure 5 abou" h^re
than the supporting coalition; the new policy is framed to a high level of
detail by an individual or small group and is then exposed with minor revisions
to a widening circle. In a school district this involvement might ultimately
include the Hoard of Education, the teaching staff and union hierarchy, parents
of students, specific interest groups in the community and eventually the general
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Figure 5: Three Temporal Patterns of
Emergent Policy Refraning
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Analysis
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public. At the other extreme (labeled "C" in Figure 5), the coalition of
involved participants is broadened firsL, and within this bro-ider forum the
formal analysis later develops specificity and detail. Pattern "B" in Figure 5
is a middle ground in which formal analysis and the size of the involved coali-
tion develop at roughly the same pace.
Quinn seems to argue that pattern "B" is optimal for effective strategic
change. T.ve wish to keep open the possibility that the full range of patterns
may be workable, depending on the nature of the decisions involved and perhaps
on certain characteristics of the district and its embedding community. Pattern
A represents a more centralized approach to change and pattern C a more par-
ticipative approach.
Emergent Policv Reframing at Riverside
Given this framework, how can we make theoretical sense of the budget
process in Riverside?
Up until the fall of 1980, the Riverside High School District was clearly
still in an expansive growth mode. Two new teachers had been hired; three
separate bond referenda totalling seven million dollars (equal almost to the
annual budget of the district) were being planned; a substantial contract for
10^ salary increases had been negotiated with the teachers' unio*v; a joint
venture with a regional vocational education cooperative was being seriously
considered; the district was thought to be in "great financial condition;"
and no budget cuts of any kind were being contemplated.
By the summer of 1982, however, ten teachers with an annual salary budget
of $72U,Q00 nan been cut frcm tho staff; other cuts totalling aoout $80,000
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were made in the operating budget; all of the bond referenda had been post-
poned indefinitely; an opr.ratJns deficit, of $400,000 to *&0n t n00 w^s f^reca^t:
salary increases were deferred; the vocational cooperative venture was
shelved; a decline in student enrollment was discovered; short-tern arrange-
ments to finance the impending deficit were planned; and a general mood of
fiscal conservatism replaced the expansive growth mode.
Clearly the district had undergone a major shift in policy frames over
the two year span. Budgetary problems had risen in priority from a minor
annoyance to the central problem of the district.
During the two years a series of external events gradually eroded the
plausibility of the old growth frame and increased the plausibility of the new
conservative frame: the failure of the March 1980 referendum; informal advice
from the local business community that a fall 1980 referendum would not pass;
continuing high interest rates in the bond market; business acquiescence to
dropping VOCED; neighboring 3igtown's precipitous cut in its tax base and its
equally precipitous, but instructive, overreaction; and the surprise closing of
the local manufacturing plant in early 1981.
Still, the Superintendent regarded the slowdown to be temporary, of two
to four year's duration, and he refused to accept the deficits as permanent
£tr;ic:ural changes in r.h, district 1 *: 'inanres. In his own words, his use of
short-term refinancing of the debt was based on a "gamble" that the economy
and the fortunes of the district would rebound.
Given this ambiguity the actions taken can be seen to be reasonable within
both views of the world. The cuts made early in 1932 amounted to less than 50%
of ;hc forecasted deficit. And those teachers' positions that were cut tended
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to be in areas, such as driver's education, art, and the remedial reading
progtai'i, that were peripheral to the values o: th*t discreet.
Emergent Policy Refraining (EPR) provides an accurate description of
Riverside's budget cutting process in several important respects:
1. Ambivalent actions : Unlike the precipitous reaction in neighboring
Bigtown, Riverside's response to its financial problems avoided an immediate
discrediting of the old policy frame. Relatively small cuts were made so
that simultaneously doubts about the plausibility of the old frame were sown
and a newly emerging policy frame was made more plausible. During the period
of policy ambivalence, bond referenda were delayed, but not cancelled.
2. Delayed commitments : Even though Peterson realized that further cuts
would be necessary as early as June 1981, decisions were not finally made until
March 1982, just prior to the April 1st deadline for termination notices imposed
by the union contract. By delaying the decision, time was made available to
gather detailed, and previously unavailable, information about the internal
operations of the district. Equally and perhaps more important, possible
changes in the condition of the local economy and the state of the bond market
were permitted to develop. There was no rush to judgment that could be invali-
dated by subsequent events. This delay was conscious and deliberate on the part
o>
c Lhe Superintendent.. It was in no s< .::; e the result of ina'vei tent procastIlla-
tion.
3. Development of an information base : Because of the possibility of
continued future cuts, Peterson cast his information net widely. AC members
were encouraged to be "as wild and imaginative" as they could be in their
initial proposals. Ai though the final decisions in ildrch '9t<2 vere limited
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and focused to a few areas, the entire evaluation process created a compre-
hensive and shciied data b^sed w i.thiu the AC about internal operations thac
did not exist prior to the process of deciding where to cut. It also helped
to create a shared set of values and preferences. In this sense, the process
also helped to articulate a new policy frame for the district, at least
within the AC, one that was grounded in a more complete factual understanding
of what was possible and what was important. Given this improved information
base, the district was in an excellent position to make further cuts in the
future, if necessary.
4. Creation of awareness : Although detailed discussions took place
only within the AC, the Superintendent used "controlled leaks" to develop
gradually an awareness elsewhere in the district of the existence of budget
discussions and of the general magnitude and shape of the cuts. When the
cuts were finally announced, there were few surprises among the major stake-
holders. In fact, even the superintendent was surprised at the level of
acceptance and support which followed the cuts.
5. Signals and symbolic actions : As a new policy frame gained ascendency
the district made cuts partially to save money but also to create expectations
of further cuts among the teachers and the Board. For example, the
bup^rinteudent argued -that the dclJar amouvt of. the cnfs was Ipss importer* : to
him than creating the right "psychology." Consider the following conversation
held in May 1982:
Superintendent: Remember I never defined any [dollar] goal. It wasn't
get $500,000 out of the budget or get a set amount.
It was very purposeful because we were going through
a^> exercise as much a<- we were going through a specific
goal kind oi thing. [ We- were] setting up a whole
posture, a whole psychology amongst the teachers, chat
we're looking at everything, a psychology with the
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union that negotiations are going to be tough because
of all the budget constraints. And we're even having
to do some things char we don 1 c want to do with irne
Board— 'Yes, we'ie spending your money carefully'....
I can't even tell you [how much money the suggested
cuts] represent. What it does represent is sorae
visible things that people can say are going to be
different next year than they were last year.
Investigator: You don't have the total?
S: I do not know how much those add up to. I don't
even care.
I: Not even a rough estimation?
S: I don't even care.
Thus, the dollar amount of the cuts was less important to the Superintendent than
their symbolic content.
6. Development of slack resources: Through a variety of short term
financing, a partial solution to managing the deficit was made possible. High
interest rates in the bond market and a low likelihood of successful referenda
prevented long term solutions to the financial shortfall. But short term
refinancing, although carrying some risk, made resources available so that less
than 50% of the expected deficit had to be managed through cuts in expenditures.
7. Retrospective interpretation of events : At the time certain key
events occurred (e.g., the failure of the March 1980 referendum, and the
financial sta:us of chc district in July 19H'j). they were frequently either
ignored or interpreted as anomalies. An important part of the subsequent
decision process was to reinterpret those events and to use those rein-
terpretations as rationales for later decisions. This includes a re-
examination of the impact of past decisions. For example, one part of the
budgeting deliberations during early 1982 was a review and evaluation ot Che
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cuts made in March lQtti ,-„„i j •^rcta 1981, including an analysis of the magnitude of the
reaiizcn savinco
» I^HIin^f external ewnf , ; Through
. varleCy Qf ^^ ^
tacts with local business people In colonic, organizations and with other
educators, Peterson continued to monitor the mood of the district and region-
Its receptivity to referenda and Its acceptance of cuts In various parts of
the educational budget.
9. Loose coupling of criteria i-« a*>~*g Ca n t0 decisions
: Although criteria for
making cuts were spelled out at the November 1931 *Ciydi A meting no explicit weight
were ever attached to the criteria. Nor were the criteria ever systematically
employed in arriving at the final cuts. Xndeed the.v were barely discussed or
aehated. The criteria did, however, serve as a checklist for evaluating
possible cuts. For example, some cuts were eliminated from consideration
because the.v had no i2Hedlate. financial impact on the next year's expenditures.
But there was no evidence that every suesest^H n»«-gg ed cut was measured systematically
against every criterion.
10. Detailed analvsis
: The foregoing does not mean that careful de-
tailed analysis was not carried out in certain instances, but the analysis
was localized. For example, because of teacher seniority, eliminating cer-
tain positions (e.g., Driver . s EducstJon) dw „., ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^
person filling that position would necessarily be saved. First, that person
could "bump- a more junior staff member in another area (e.g., science) and
j
take over that position so that only the more junior staff member's salary
'•-Id be cut. Second, state subsidies for Driver's Education w, ld be lost
-1th the elimination of that position, so that the net savings wouid be
something less than the junior person's salary, bailed analvses of this
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type occupied a substantial percentage of the long AC meetings held in January
and February 1982. The nature of such analysis was io'_al and incremental, not
comprehensive applied to all alternatives. But it would be fundamentally in
error to say that decisions were intuitive or purely political in nature; careful
financial analysis was most definitely an integral part of the latter stages of
the budget cutting process. The reasonableness of possible actions was given
close attention.
11. Analvsis oosterior to commitment: In some cases, the firm commit-
ment to make certain cuts was made prior to a full analysis of the impact of
the cuts. For example, the firm decision was made to reduce several secre-
tarial positions from 12 month to 10 month contracts. Only after that com-
mitment was made did the AC begin to grapple with issues such as whether
vacation time, personal leave, sick. leave, health and life insurance and
other fringe-benefits would be reduced proportionately. Reversing the commit-
ment never arose as an issue. But the decision had been made without a com-
plete definition of what the alternative truly was. That definition remained
as a post-choice activity. This represents a powerful illustration of the
assertion that "intelligence" and "design" activities may follow rather than
precede choice activity.
CONCLUSION—EPR AS A GENERAL THEORY OF STRATEGIC CHANGE
We believe that the process of emergent policy reframing provides a broadly
general description of strategic change in organizations. Although key events
may cause a radical "jump" in the decay of an old frame or the plausibility of
it3 successor, the general uution that both frames musi co-exist for a period of
time is important.
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In the first place, too little attention has been given to the "death" of
the assumption and vslues „blch new cver,cs ^ ,;Dpiauslflle< Tannenbauc ^.^
suggests that relinquishing past ways of doing things in an organization can
mirror the stages of coping with death itself. Individuals need a period of
time in which to register shock, denial, grief and mourning. The acceptance of
new ideas depends upon this process of relinquishing the past. EPR undercovers
how organizations can work to encourage the ^^h «f „„ in death or no longer appropriate frames
of understanding.
At the same time, a new policy frame also needs a period of development. I
The first events challenging the old frame are too sparse and confusing to ex-
hibit a pattern. More than one alternative frame is likely to be plausible. I
Experimentation and analysis is almost always necessary before one of these I
frames seems more sensible than the others.
The process of discovering a new frame also must take place at several I
levels. The chief executive of the organization is most often the key spokes-
person for an organization's policy frame. His or her individual realization of
a new frame is fed by and must feed the development of framing ideas among other
organization members, especially other key executives. Finally, a broader group
of outsiders, starting with the Board of Directors and extending to the financial
community, customers a .d others, must also bo involved. ' Hn S process ta.es t.m,.
Kuhn's (19XX) description of the passage from normal to "extraordinary" I
science in anticipation of the shift to a new paradigm may provide the best ana-
logue for the process we are trying to describe. The time period when two or I
more policy frames arc more or less equally pia,siblo is the organizational I
equivalent of extraordinary science.
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As in science, conflict is especially likely during the period when one frame
is \oz clearly dominant. Further, when the i = sue at Stake i^ budget- allocation,
conflict is even more likely (Gerwin, 1969). The Riverside case is especially
interesting because so little of this conflict was evident. Many different
aspects of the EPR process gave the superintendent, staff, Board, teachers and
community, time to become more familiar with, and less threatened by, a changing
environment. At the same time several aspects of the general process helped the
administrative staff and other stakeholder's depersonalize the impact of a new
frame on their more parochial interests. The Superintendent's emphasis on
developing a process for budget cutting, while delaying for almost six months any
discussion of the content of cuts to be made appears to have been especially
important for defusing potential conflict. The broader environment also helped
make clear the necessity of cuts (as the Superintendent said, "the teachers see
people without jobs on TV every night") and provided a negative example in
Bigtown.
Nevertheless, our analysis shows that considerable disagreement existed on
the specific cuts which should be made, once the discussion actually got to
specifics. The AC members represented the variety of interests in the district,
and some of these interests fared better than others in the budget cutting pro-
cess. 'J'h*3 a^sence of cou/rlict despite their di rTer£nce3 is ,in pact due to an r.;
nization culture which stressed collaboration and consensus. It is also due, we
believe, to the strong approval of the budget cutting process. This approval
indicates a new policy frame in its ascendency. As the new frame and the budget
cutting mechanism became accepted, AC members, teacher and others were willing to
accept the several unanticipated cuts that emerged at the end of the long series
of meetings. They also appreared willing to accept the AC meeting as an arena
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««*.^ fucure dlsagreements over spficlflc cu[s couid ^ ^^^^^ ^ ^this commonality, we belioVe rh^i- ~„„ . <=^•v
'
^ naL
-
accounts for the relative - =„i^ dt
- l
'
ac« or conflict
:Riverside.
«* other patterns of participatlon may be _ appropriate ^ other ^^«~. Che general process Qf emergenc poUcy re£raming ^^^^ ^
- * keep p0Centlally devlsive issues> ^^ ^ budg£t ^^ ^^ o^
an organization. Budget rni-c o~> . ,cuts are potentially frame breaking activities. The
organization must therefore attend to th. fe frame setting implications of budget
cutting, before specific cuts are likelv to Mvy make sense to, and be accepted by,
organization members.
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APPENDIX B: Chronology of Key Events
March:
July:
August
:
September
October:
December:
- 2 new staff hired
- $4,000,000 building bond referendum fails by 2 to 1
margin
- new teacher contract negotiated; 10% salary in-
crease
- "great financial position"
- asbestos problem discovered
- bond referendum rescheduled for December; two
other bond referenda being considered; also tax
anticipation warrants
- referendum deferred until next year
- graduate realization of potential cash flow
problems
- Superintendent cools on VOCED project
- 17% cut in tax base in Bigtown
- Superintendent plans cash flow analysis
- further deferral of building bond referendum
until February 1982
1981
January:
February:
Siai ch
:
April:
- consideration of "back door" referendum for life-
safety bonds to finance asbestos removal
- VOCED discussed at Board study session
- Deputy Superintendent forecasts $600,000 deficit
- 5 t'.ac her? cut from staff
- local plant in Riverside makss surprise announce-
ment of plant closing (5% of tax base)
- "no go" decision on VOCED
- building bond referendum deferred indefinitely
- AC discussion of possible cuts in summer budget
- Superintendent looks back to reinterpre.t economic
downturn of last year, and concludes the budget
is now "biggest problem"
-41-
1981 (continued)
June;
August:
Sept. -Oct.
:
November:
December:
uew higher ta:-: multiplier cnnouneed
Superintendent begins to think of how to arrive
at more cuts
"controlled leaks" about budget cuts to teachers'
union head
Superintendent asks staff to generate original
proposals for budget cuts; no dollar figure in
mind
staff begin to work on budget cut proposals
Superintendent now forecasting $400,000 deficit
181 items for possible cuts condensed into 36
categories
Superintendent asks staff for revised lists of
cuts
AC meeting to conclude discussion of 36 categories
Superintendent reminds staff to compile $50,000
of proposed cuts
1982
January:
Feb. -March
May
:
Revised proposals discussed at AC meeting and
condensed into 15 items
Superintendent now talking about $100,000-
200,000 in cuts
Subject-by-subject discussion of possible cuts as
part of regular staff planning process; results
in cutting 5 teaching positions ($110,000), plus
approximately $80,000 worth of other cuts
Interest rates continue to be high in bond market
Superintendent cons ic; aling use of advance refund-
ing bonds to finance remaining deficit
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